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Abstract 
Sci‐ Hub has been referred to as the “Robin Hood” of science, but in reality, it is not. Sci‐ Hub is a disruption to the 
entire scholarly publishing research cycle. Over the last three years, the amount of licensed e‐ content that has 
been illegally obtained by Sci‐ Hub has grown significantly. This content has been acquired through stolen institu-
tional staff and student credentials. Acquiring and misappropriating these credentials creates serious risks for an 
institution’s systems and users as well as publishers. What can libraries and publishers do to minimize or eliminate 
these infractions? This discussion about the collective efforts of publishers, libraries, and other organizations will 
cover how to protect electronic resources, personal data, and adopting best practices in order to better defend 
from cyberattacks that compromise our organizations. We will discuss how these attacks can occur and steps you 
can take to protect your library. While, unfortunately, there is no one single solution for this problem, we will also 
look at a case study of a library that successfully implemented some of these practices to combat the cyberattacks. 
Through this we will demonstrate that together we can reduce the risks facing researchers, librarians, and publish-
ers created by Sci‐ Hub.
How	Does	Sci-	Hub	Acquire	Content? 
Why	Should	You	Care?
Ultimately, Sci‐ Hub’s illegal activities harm learned 
societies that are reliant on subscription income to 
support their important work; it is a threat to the 
scholarly communications ecosystem, the sustain-
ability of high‐ quality journals, as well as the ability 
to invest in new journals and fields. Sci‐ Hub has no 
incentive to ensure the accuracy of the research 
articles being accessed, and its continued operation 
poses a threat to the accuracy of the scientific record 
(Page, 2018). This statement given by Elsevier and 
Springer Nature is one of the main reasons why pub-
lishers, including IEEE and other not‐ for‐ profits, are 
taking action and not taking a back seat.
Sci‐ Hub steals scholarly content predominantly 
by using stolen user credentials acquired through 
phishing attacks or other nefarious means. This 
enables them to illegally access university networks, 
steal licensed content, and ultimately make it freely 
available to the public. But what else do these stolen 
user credentials allow Sci‐ Hub to access? What else 
can they do besides steal content? Although we do 
not have any hard evidence of other types of illegal 
use (e.g., credit card theft, identity theft), we want to 
stress the vulnerabilities and risks to personal data 
that this situation implies. 
Not only are publishers and institutions responsi-
ble for protecting content and personal data, but 
the end users who access electronic resources 
are accountable as well. It is imperative that end 
users adopt stronger passwords, comply with both 
university policies and copyright law, and not share 
credentials or access documents on Sci‐ Hub. IEEE has 
found in 99% of these cases where universities have 
informed IEEE of the interactions with the com-
promised end user, that the end users don’t even 
realize that their account has been seized. These 
are not users who are necessarily visiting Sci‐ Hub or 
deliberately sharing their network credentials, but 
rather innocent victims of piracy. Institutions can 
train staff and students to be aware of these vul-
nerabilities and the consequences of using Sci‐ Hub, 
strengthen security by implementing tools such as 
dual‐ factor authentication, and respond to con-
tent providers when alerted of such activity. Other 
recommended steps to secure access can be also be 
found in an article on the Scholarly Kitchen (https:// 
scholarlykitchen .sspnet .org /2018 /04 /24 /guest ‐ post 
‐ technology ‐ law ‐ education ‐ three ‐ pronged ‐ approach 
‐ fight ‐ digital ‐ piracy/).
Publishers have and continue to partner with insti-
tutions to educate and inform students and faculty 
about Sci‐ Hub activity. IEEE has already worked with 
several universities in the United States, Australia, 
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and Singapore to develop solutions in order to help 
them protect the integrity of their networks as well 
as published content. Many of these compromised 
institutions have now, with our help, begun to under-
stand that the vulnerabilities lay within their own 
authentication systems and found ways to mitigate 
these risks (Frances, 2018).
Publishing	Community	Efforts
Beginning in 2014, IEEE and other publishers began 
tracking and alerting institutions about Sci‐ Hub 
activity. In early 2017, IEEE began requesting cus-
tomers to provide data regarding the illicit activ-
ity in order to learn more about these attacks on 
both the university’s firewall and IEEE’s. This was a 
mutually beneficial effort to advocate for security 
for both parties. In discussions with universities, we 
learned from librarians that temporary suspension 
of access to the IEEE Xplore platform (a common 
means to deal with a breach of access) was not an 
ideal approach. As a result of these discussions, we 
worked with Juan Denzer from SUNY Binghamton 
(now at SUNY Oswego) who developed a script to 
automatically block Sci‐ Hub activity without having 
an adverse effect on legitimate users. IEEE staff then 
modified the script to accommodate institutions 
using other platforms. Continued feedback has been 
extremely important in our efforts to provide tech-
nical solutions to mitigate Sci‐ Hub activity. IEEE has 
a dedicated team to address these concerns and is 
working on developing additional solutions that are 
both effective and customer friendly.
Other publisher efforts include the Sci‐ Hub Executive 
Steering Group formed in August 2017, consisting 
of members from 15 different publishers that have 
come together to address this problem and strate-
gically collaborate on solutions. This includes legal, 
technical, and educational methods that we hope 
will disrupt and/or eventually shut down Sci‐ Hub.
Case	Study—Binghamton	University
In the fall of 2016, Binghamton University Libraries 
was contacted by the IEEE manager of digital license 
compliance. IEEE began to suspend access to their 
content due to excessive illegal downloads. The block 
affected patrons, faculty, and staff. The library lack 
of access meant a loss in spending for a product not 
being used. 
Initially, the library manually located the compro-
mised accounts and took action. The library system 
administrator would spend hours searching log files 
to find the accounts that were used in the breach. 
Each user account was flagged and blocked in 
the EZproxy server. Patrons were then notified to 
change their password. Once the EZproxy server was 
secured, the IEEE manager of digital license compli-
ance was contacted. The library system administrator 
assured them the server was secure and made a 
request to reinstate access to IEEE content.
The process became a routine of seek, secure, notify, 
and reinstate. This periodic plan would happen 
almost daily. The library was being compromised on 
a regular basis. Most compromises were between 
January to February 2017.
By March 2017, the system administrator at Bing-
hamton University determined that the process was 
using too much of the library’s resources. These 
included hours searching log files, time spent mod-
ifying the server, and contacting IEEE to reinstate 
access. In order to minimize the resources dedicated 
to combating the issue, the process was automated.
The automated process was achieved by developing 
a server script to work in three phases: seek, secure, 
and notify. Seek involved searching the EZproxy 
log files for a unique flag. This flag was created and 
embedded by the IEEE technical support team. 
Locating the flag in the log files is what allowed the 
library to identify the hacked account. Previously the 
system administrator had to manually search for the 
flag. What normally took a large amount of time now 
took microseconds to complete. This significantly 
cut the amount of time spent searching log files. The 
script could also be scheduled to run more often 
than a manual search.
Secure, the second phase, was the process of secur-
ing the EZproxy server. This involved blocking the 
originating IP address and temporarily blocking the 
compromised account. The EZproxy server is sus-
pended, so the script can modify the configuration 
files. This modification adds a block directive to the 
hacked IP and patron account. The server’s service is 
then restarted. The process is done within seconds. 
The process is seamless and suspended access to 
EZproxy is minimal. 
The final phase, notify, involved sending an e‐ mail 
to the system administrator and IEEE manager of 
digital license compliance. The system administra-
tor received a time‐ stamped e‐ mail with the list of 
compromised accounts as well as the IP addresses. 
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This allowed the library to forward the list to their 
campus IT department. The IT department would 
notify the users on the list to update their password. 
The second e‐ mail list sent to IEEE only included 
the IP addresses. This allowed them to block the IP 
address on their servers. 
Since IEEE was notified automatically, it was not 
necessary for the library to contact IEEE directly. The 
list of IP addresses was already an indication that the 
server was secured. 
The server script was a preemptive defense against 
attacks to the EZproxy server. Since the script ran 
faster and about every five minutes, any attempts 
to download content dropped significantly. This is in 
contrast to the prior process that couldn’t keep up 
with the breaches, resulting in more content being 
illegally downloaded. Once the script was imple-
mented in August 2017, the illegal downloads went 
to zero. 
Since the implementation of the script, Binghamton 
University has gone from being the most compro-
mised library to virtually zero compromises. As a 
result, IEEE technical support developed a similar 
script for Linux‐ based servers.
IEEE	Efforts:	We	Can	Help
IEEE’s Digital Licensing team has been working with 
libraries and guiding them through the process of 
tracking and blocking Sci‐ Hub activity. In addition 
they provide resources that help prevent Sci‐ Hub 
activity either before or after a breach. IEEE has also 
worked with organizations such as OCLC (www .oclc 
.org) and PSI (www .publishersolutionsint .com) to 
develop and implement several freely- available tools 
(discussed below). They can work with university IT/
ITS departments to implement the following tools:
Before a Breach
Option 1: Special code to protect from future 
breaches
Option 2: Updated Stanza for EZproxy access 
(prevent blocking) 
Option 3: Windows and Linux script solutions 
(currently working on the next generation)
Option 4: Proactively identify blacklisted/Sci‐ Hub 
IP addresses: IP Registry—www .theipregistry .org 
These free tools can help protect against future 
attacks and breaches. Institutions have to decide 
Figure	1.	Total	IEEE	data	breaches	at	Binghamton	University	for	one	year.
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what’s right for their library and the resources 
needed to implement some or all of these tools. 
After a Breach
• IEEE sends log files that include:
 ◦ Date and time
 ◦ Information on how to remediate
• Collaborate with IT/ITS department
• Alleviate downtime for customers in differ-
ent time zones (respond within less than 24 
hours)
EZproxy	and	RA21
EZproxy access and authentication software allows 
your library to deliver e‐ content simply and effec-
tively. EZproxy facilitates a single sign‐ in to e‐ con-
tent using existing library‐ issued credentials, such 
as a library card number and PIN or username and 
password. EZproxy interoperates with a number of 
authentication facilities including Shibboleth (SAML), 
LDAP, Active Directory, and SIP.
Normally, EZproxy uses credentials (username, pass-
word, multifactor if present) supplied by institution 
identity providers (IdP). RA21 emphasizes using 
SAML‐ based IdPs and EZproxy supports this authenti-
cation method.
Resource Access for the 21st Century (RA21) is a 
joint STM and NISO initiative aimed at optimizing 
protocols across key stakeholder groups, with a 
goal of facilitating a seamless user experience for 
consumers of scientific communication. In addition, 
this comprehensive initiative is working to solve 
long‐ standing, complex, and broadly distributed 
challenges in the areas of network security and  
user privacy. 
It is likely that RA21 will specify updated patterns 
and/or standards for SAML‐ based authentication 
workflows. EZproxy interoperates with RA21‐ enabled 
sites today and will be updated to support applicable 
RA21 patterns and/or standards.
Security Policies to Protect  
Against Breaches
The majority of successful breaches come from 
stolen credentials. Credentials can be guessed or 
phished for (usually via e‐ mail). It is essential that 
good credential management practices and policies 
are defined at your institution (including the library 
and EZproxy).
The best defense against stolen credentials is multi-
factor authentication (MFA) where another creden-
tial is supplied from a different source such as am 
SMS message. Many institution identity providers 
support MFA. 
Figure	2.	Total	daily	IEEE	data	breaches	at	Binghamton	University	from	December	2016	to	December	2017.
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If MFA is not available, then developing and adhering 
to a set of security management policies oriented 
around passwords is essential. Since EZproxy is part 
of the security domain, it should be included in the 
covered applications of the policy.
The policy should contain:
• Short password lifetimes (less than 90 days)
• Password complexity requirements (not 
dictionary words, letters, numbers, punctu-
ation required)
• A breach detection process: how to validate 
that a set of credentials has been used for 
malicious access
• Frequent exercising of the breach detection 
process
• Education plan for students, staff, and 
patrons
The breach detection process should include under-
standing where breaches can be detected and a 
written plan for resolution including detection steps, 
and organizations that need to be involved such as 
the institution’s IT, publishers, and so on.
The education plan’s goal is to show students and 
staff that stealing credentials has a widespread 
effect in a typical institution environment. Institu-
tions that have a widely implemented single‐ sign‐ on 
(SSO) infrastructure have many systems—not 
related to library access—that become available 
when credentials are stolen including financial, 
scheduling, and course learning systems. Once 
students and staff realize the personal cost of stolen 




EZproxy currently has a number of tools to help 
protect and diagnose malicious access. The EZproxy 
websiteand Community Center have a number 
of tools identified. Additionally, these actions are 
recommended:
• Ensure that EZproxy’s log files (audit 
log, messages.txt, and ezproxy.log) are 
secured via appropriate operating system 
permissions. 
• Keep and back up at least 180 days of 
EZproxy log data.
• Use SSL for all authentication interac-
tions and to all content providers that 
support SSL.
• Keep your server operating system 
upgraded with the latest vendor patches.
• Keep your server’s clock (time) correctly set 
against Internet standard time servers.
• Upgrade your EZproxy configuration to 
the latest version. Each version of EZproxy 
updates a number of security‐ related 
features.
Some publishers recommend including the EZproxy 
Option X‐ Forwarded‐ For configuration statement. 
This statement tells EZproxy to send the IP address of 
the browser user to the publisher. This information 
can be helpful to the publisher when malicious usage 
occurs and helps avoid the publisher shutting down 
the IP address of the proxy service, denying access to 
all users. 
As described above, it’s important to exercise breach 
detection processes regularly and before a pub-
lisher contacts you threatening to turn off access. 
The detection process for malicious access through 
EZproxy has two main paths:
• Being able to identify a user session from 
publisher‐ supplied information (which nor-
mally includes URLs and date/time of access)
• Being able to identify potential compro-
mised users based on user behavior
Both of these processes are documented on the 
OCLC Support website.
Future versions of EZproxy will continue to add new 
security‐ related features including automation of 
some of the manual steps described here. With a 
solid password and security policy as well as moni-
toring EZproxy logs, EZproxy provides a secure access 
process for accessing STEM content. 
Conclusion
The threats of security are a problem for the entire 
academic and publishing community. As a result of 
collaborating with publishers, libraries, and other 
organizations, the efforts to combat Sci‐ Hub have 
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successfully minimized the threat, but not com-
pletely eliminated it. Institutions that have imple-
mented not only their own scripts and processes to 
protect themselves from imminent attacks have seen 
a significant drop in piracy. Therefore, current and 
future solutions along with education implemented 
by libraries and publishers will assist in the protec-
tion against digital piracy.
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